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ABSTRACT
We describe Quizz, a gamified crowdsourcing system that
simultaneously assesses the knowledge of users and acquires
new knowledge from them. Quizz operates by asking users to
complete short quizzes on specific topics; as a user answers
the quiz questions, Quizz estimates the user’s competence.
To acquire new knowledge, Quizz also incorporates questions
for which we do not have a known answer; the answers given
by competent users provide useful signals for selecting the
correct answers for these questions. Quizz actively tries
to identify knowledgeable users on the Internet by running
advertising campaigns, effectively leveraging the targeting
capabilities of existing, publicly available, ad placement ser-
vices. Quizz quantifies the contributions of the users using
information theory and sends feedback to the advertising
system about each user. The feedback allows the ad targeting
mechanism to further optimize ad placement.
Our experiments, which involve over ten thousand users,
confirm that we can crowdsource knowledge curation for
niche and specialized topics, as the advertising network can
automatically identify users with the desired expertise and
interest in the given topic. We present controlled experiments
that examine the effect of various incentive mechanisms,
highlighting the need for having short-term rewards as goals,
which incentivize the users to contribute. Finally, our cost-
quality analysis indicates that the cost of our approach is
below that of hiring workers through paid-crowdsourcing
platforms, while offering the additional advantage of giving
access to billions of potential users all over the planet, and
being able to reach users with specialized expertise that is
not typically available through existing labor marketplaces.
1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing has been the primary enabling mechanism
behind the generation of many valuable Internet resources.
Wikipedia, Freebase, and other knowledge repositories were
created by volunteers who contributed knowledge about a
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wide variety of topics. Other human computation applica-
tions engage users in creative ways to generate interesting and
useful by-products of the engagement. The ESP Game [33]
asks users to participate in a game that generates useful
image tags. ReCAPTCHA [34] verifies that users are hu-
mans by asking them to transcribe letters from a distorted
image, thus helping with the digitization of books. Duolingo1
teaches users a new language and as a by-product generates
translations of written material in different languages. How-
ever, despite these widely-known success stories, building
and engaging a community of users is a challenging task.
Coming up with creative engagement strategies (e.g., ESP
Game) is difficult, and spawning successful crowd-powered
sites such as Wikipedia often seems like the exception rather
than the norm.
In order to sidestep the problem, many efforts rely on
paid crowdsourcing; for example, hiring workers through
platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk allows for di-
rect engagement of users, with a clear monetary incentive.
Unfortunately, the introduction of money as a predictable
and repeatable motivator is a mixed blessing. Users who are
motivated by monetary rewards are often different than the
users who are unpaid and motivated by other means [22, 28,
40]. Furthermore, studies indicate that the use of monetary
rewards can be highly detrimental for users who are already
intrinsically motivated [4]: the introduction of monetary
compensation reveals to the users exactly how much their
work is valued by the task requester, and low payments make
things worse [16].
Finally, even if the incentive problem is solved, how does
one attract the crowd that is properly qualified for a given
task? The workers participating in paid crowdsourcing are
typically non-expert users, and often lack the skills needed
for the crowdsourcing effort. For example, if one’s task calls
for Swahili speakers or maxillofacial surgeons, then most
labor marketplaces do not even provide access to such users,
or only have few users with required expertise.
Thus, a set of natural challenging questions emerge. Can
we replicate the predictability of paid crowdsourcing in terms
of attracting participation, while engaging unpaid users?
And how can we identify and incentivize experts among
these users, who match the needs of the application at hand?
Here we propose to use existing Internet advertising plat-
forms for targeting and attracting users, with the suitable
expertise for the task at hand. Over the last decade, adver-
tising platforms have improved their targeting capabilities
to identify users who are good matches for the goals of the
1http://www.duolingo.com/
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Quizz system.
advertiser. In our case, we initiate the process with simple
advertising campaigns but also integrate the ad campaign
with the crowdsourcing application, and provide feedback
to the advertising system for each ad click: The feedback
indicates whether the user, who clicked on the ad, “converted”
and the total contributions of the crowdsourcing effort. This
allows the advertising platform to naturally identify web-
sites with user communities that are good matches for the
given task. For example, in our experiments with acquiring
medical knowledge, we initially believed that “regular” Inter-
net users would not have the necessary expertise. However,
the advertising system automatically identified sites such
as Mayo Clinic and HealthLine, which are frequented by
knowledgeable consumers of health information who ended
up contributing significant amounts of high-quality medi-
cal knowledge. Our idea is inspired by Hoffman et al. [17],
who used advertising to attract users to a Wikipedia-editing
experiment, although they did not attempt to target users
nor attempted to optimize the ad campaign by providing
feedback to the advertising platform.
Once users arrive at our site, we need to engage them to
contribute useful information. Our crowdsourcing platform,
Quizz, invites users to test their knowledge in a variety of
domains and see how they fare against other users. Figure 1
shows an example question. Our quizzes include two kinds
of questions: Calibration questions have known answers,
and are used to assess the expertise and reliability of the
users. On the other hand, collection questions have no
known answers and actually serve to collect new information,
and our platform identifies the correct answers based on
the answers provided by the (competent) participants. To
optimize how often to test the user, and how often to present a
question with an unknown answer, we use a Markov Decision
Process [29], which formalizes the exploration/exploitation
framework and selects the optimal strategy at each point.
As our analysis shows, a key component for the success
of the crowdsourcing effort is not just getting users to par-
ticipate, but also to keep the good users participating for
long, while gently discouraging low-quality users from par-
ticipating. In a series of controlled experiments, involving
tens of thousands of users, we show that a key advantage
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Figure 2: An overview of the Quizz system.
of attracting unpaid users through advertising is the strong
self-selection of high-quality users to continue contributing,
while low-quality users self-select to drop out. Furthermore,
our experimental comparison with paid crowdsourcing (both
paid hourly and paid piecemeal) shows that our approach
dominates paid crowdsourcing both in terms of the quality
of users and in terms of the total monetary cost required to
complete the task.
The contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, we
formulate the notion of targeted crowdsourcing, which allows
one to identify crowds of users with desired expertise. We
then describe a practical approach to find such users at scale
by leveraging existing advertising systems. Second, we show
how to optimally ask questions to the users, to leverage
their knowledge. Third, we evaluate the utility of a host of
different engagement mechanisms, which incentivize users to
contribute more high-quality answers via the introduction of
short-term goals and rewards. Finally, our empirical results
confirm that the proposed approach allows to collect and
curate knowledge with accuracy that is superior to that of
paid crowdsourcing mechanisms at the same or lower cost.
Figure 2 shows the overview of the system, and the various
components that we discuss in the paper. Section 2 describes
the use of advertising to target promising users, and how
we set up the campaigns to allow for continuous, automatic
optimization of the results over time. Section 3 shows the
details of our information-theoretic scheme for measuring
the expertise of the participants, while Section 4 gives the
details of our exploration-exploitation scheme. Section 5
discusses our experiments on how to keep users engaged,
and Section 6 gives the details of our experimental results.
Finally, Section 7 describes related work, while Section 8
concludes.
2. ADVERTISINGFORTARGETINGUSERS
A key problem of every crowdsourcing effort is soliciting
users to participate. At a fundamental level, it is always
preferable to attract users that have an inherent motivation
for participation. Unfortunately, repeating the successes of
efforts such as Wikipedia, TripAdvisor, and Yelp seems more
of an art than a science, and we do not yet fully understand
Figure 3: Example ad to attract users
how to create engaging and viral crowdsourcing applications
in a replicable manner. The emergence of paid crowdsourcing
(e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk) allows direct engagement
of users in exchange for monetary rewards. However, the
population of users who participate due to extrinsic rewards
is typically different from the users who participate because
of their intrinsic motivation.
Quizz uses online advertising to attract unpaid users to
contribute. By running ads, we get into the middle ground
between paid and unpaid crowdsourcing. Users who arrive at
our site through an ad are not getting paid, and if they choose
to participate they obviously do so because of their intrinsic
motivation. This removes some of the wrong incentives and
tends to alleviate concerns about indifferent users that “spam”
the results just to get paid, or about workers that are trying
to do the minimum work necessary in order to get paid.
Thanks to the sheer reach of modern advertising platforms,
the population of unpaid users can potentially be orders of
magnitude larger than that in paid marketplaces. There
are billions of users reachable through advertising, while
even the biggest crowdsourcing platforms have at most a
million users, many of them inactive [19, 18]. Therefore, if
the need arises (and subject to budgetary constraints), our
approach can elastically scale up to reach almost arbitrarily
large populations of users, by simply increasing the budget
allocated to the advertising campaign. At the same time, we
show in Section 6 that our approach allows efficient use of
the advertising budget (which is our only expenditure), and
our overall costs are the same or lower than those in paid
crowdsourcing installations.
A significant additional benefit of using an advertising
system is its ability to target users with expertise in specific
topics. For example, if we are looking for users possessing
medical knowledge, we can run a simple ad like the one in
Figure 3. To do so, we select keywords that describe the topic
of interest and ask the advertising platform to place the ad in
relevant contexts. In this study, we used Google AdWords2,
and opted into both search and display ads, while in principle
we can use any other publicly available advertising system.
Selecting appropriate keywords for an ad campaign is a
challenging topic in itself [13, 1, 20]. However, we believe
that trying to optimize the campaign only through manually
fine-tuning its keywords is of limited utility. Instead, we pro-
pose to automatically optimize the campaign by quantifying
the behavior of the users that clicked on the ad. A user
who clicks on the ad but does not participate in the crowd-
sourcing application is effectively “wasting” our advertising
budget; using the advertising terminology, such user has not
“converted.” Since we are not just interested in attracting any
users but are interested in attracting users who contribute,
we use Google Analytics3 to track user conversions. Every
2https://adwords.google.com
3http://www.google.com/analytics
time a user clicks on the ad and then participates in a quiz,
we record a conversion event, and send this signal back to
the advertising system. This way, we are effectively asking
the system to optimize the advertising campaign for maxi-
mizing the number of conversions and thus increasing our
contribution yield, instead of the default optimization for
the number of clicks.
Although optimizing for conversions is useful, it is even
better to attract competent users (as opposed to, say, users
who just go through the quiz without being knowledgeable
about the topic). That is, we want to identify users who are
both willing to participate and possess the relevant knowl-
edge. In order to give this refined type of feedback to the
advertising system, we need to measure both the quantity
and the quality of user contributions, and for each conversion
event report the true “value” of the conversion. To achieve
this aim, we set up Google Analytics to treat our site as
an e-commerce website, and for each conversion we also re-
port its value. Section 3 describes in detail our approach to
quantifying the values of conversions.
When the advertising system receives fine-grained feedback
about conversions and their value, it can improve the ad
placement and display the ad to users who are more likely
to participate and contribute high quality answers. (In our
experiments, in Section 6, this optimization led to an increase
in conversion rate from 20% to over 50%, within a period of
one month, for a campaign that was already well-optimized.)
For example, consider medical quizzes. We initially believed
that identifying users with medical expertise who are willing
to participate in our system would be an impossible task.
However, thanks to tracking conversions and modeling the
value of user contributions, AdWords started displaying our
ad on websites such as Mayo Clicic and HealthLine. These
websites are not frequented by medical professionals but by
prosumers. These users are both competent and are much
more likely than professionals to participate in a quiz that
assesses their medical knowledge—often, this is exactly the
type of users that a crowdsourcing application is looking for.
3. MEASURING USER CONTRIBUTIONS
In order to understand the contributions of a user for
each quiz, we need first to define a measurement strategy.
Measuring the user contribution using just the number of
answers is problematic, as it does not consider the quality of
the submissions. Similarly, if we just measure the quality of
the submitted answers, we do not incentivize participation.
Intuitively, we want users to contribute high quality answers,
and also contribute many answers. Thus, we need a metric
that increases as both quality and volume increase.
Information Gain: To combine both quality and quan-
tity into a single, principled metric, we adopt an information-
theoretic approach [36, 31]. We treat each user as a “noisy
channel,” and measure the total information “transmitted”
by the user during her participation. The information is
measured as the information gain contributed for each an-
swer, multiplied by the total number of answers submitted
by the user; this is the total information submitted by the
user. More formally, assume that we know the probability 𝑞
that the user answers correctly a randomly chosen question
of the quiz. Then, the information gain 𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛) is defined
as:
𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛) = 𝐻(1/𝑛, 𝑛)−𝐻(𝑞, 𝑛) (1)
where 𝑛 is the number of multiple choices in a quiz question.
We use 𝐻(𝑞, 𝑛) to define the entropy4 for an answer:
𝐻(𝑞, 𝑛) = −
(︃
𝑞 · log(𝑞) +
𝑛−1∑︁
𝑖=1
(︂
1− 𝑞
𝑛− 1
)︂
· log
(︂
1− 𝑞
𝑛− 1
)︂)︃
= −𝑞 · log(𝑞)− (1− 𝑞) · log
(︂
1− 𝑞
𝑛− 1
)︂
(2)
When 𝑞 = 1 (user always gives perfect answers), then
𝐻(𝑞, 𝑛) = 0 (i.e., no uncertainty), and if 𝑞 = 1/𝑛 (user se-
lects randomly from the 𝑛 possible answers) then 𝐻(𝑞, 𝑛) =
log(𝑛).
Information Gain under Uncertainty: In our envi-
ronment, the quality 𝑞 of a user is unknown. In fact, the goal
of Quizz is to estimate 𝑞 for each user, by asking the users to
answer a set of quiz questions. We can try to approximate
𝑞 with the ratio 𝑞 = 𝑎
𝑎+𝑏
, where 𝑎 is the number of correct
and 𝑏 is the number of incorrect answers for the user, but we
face the problem of sparse data, especially during the early
stages of the quiz when 𝑎+ 𝑏 is relatively small.
Due to the uncertainty in measuring the exact quality of
each user, we introduce a Bayesian version of the informa-
tion gain metric. Specifically, we explicitly acknowledge the
uncertainty of our measurements, and we treat the estimate
of 𝑞 as a distribution, and not as a point estimate. The
expected information gain when 𝑞 is a random variable, we
have:
𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)] =
∫︁ 1
𝑞=0
𝑃𝑟(𝑞) · 𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛) 𝑑𝑞 (3)
In our system, we assume that 𝑞 is constant across ques-
tions and latent.5 However, we observe the number of correct
answers 𝑎 from the user; when 𝑞 is constant, 𝑎 follows a bi-
nomial distribution. We use the vanilla Bayesian estimation
strategy [14] for estimating the probability of success 𝑞 in a
binomial distribution. We set Beta(1, 1) (i.e., the uniform
distribution), as the conjugate prior and then 𝑃𝑟(𝑞) is a Beta
distribution.6 After the user submits 𝑎 correct and 𝑏 incorrect
answers, 𝑃𝑟(𝑞) follows the Beta(𝑎+ 1, 𝑏+ 1) distribution:
𝑃𝑟(𝑞) = 𝑞𝑎 · (1− 𝑞)𝑏 1
𝐵(𝑎+ 1, 𝑏+ 1)
(4)
with 𝐵(𝑥, 𝑦) being the Beta function. After some algebraic
manipulations, we have:
𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑛)] = log(𝑛)− 𝑏
𝑎+ 𝑏
· log(𝑛− 1)−Ψ(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)
+
𝑎Ψ(𝑎+ 1) + 𝑏Ψ(𝑏+ 1)
𝑎+ 𝑏
(5)
where Ψ(𝑥) is the digamma function. Figure 4 shows how
𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑛)] changes for different number of answers and for
workers of varying competence. Following the same process,
4Note that the user can select among 𝑛 possible answers,
and we assume that the error probabilities are uniformly
distributed among the 𝑛− 1 incorrect answers, each being
selected with probability 1−𝑞
𝑛−1 .
5In the future, we can use Item Response Theory [12] and
allow each question to have its own 𝑞 value.
6Alternatively, we can use a mixture of Beta priors to encode
better our prior knowledge about the distribution of user
qualities [27].
Figure 4: The expected (Bayesian) information gain
values, for varying number answers, and various user
qualities, when the number of available answers for
each question 𝑛 = 2.
we also compute the variance of the information gain:
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)] =
∫︁ 1
𝑞=0
(𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛))2 ·𝑃𝑟(𝑞) 𝑑𝑞− (𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)])2
In the Appendix we list the detailed form of 𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)]. In
the next section, we discuss how we use these measurements
to optimally decide between assessing the user’s knowledge
and collecting new judgments.
4. EXPLORATION / EXPLOITATION
So far, we have described the setting where the user ar-
rives and starts participating by answering quiz questions.
Using the information gain metric, described in the previous
section, we can estimate the amount of information that
we can extract from a user if we ask a collection question,
with an unknown (to us) answer. However, our goal is not
just to estimate how much information we could get, but
actually acquire new knowledge from the user. This creates
a natural exploration-exploitation tradeoff. We can choose
to “explore” how competent is the user, asking calibration
questions, getting increasingly higher confidence about the
user’s competence on a topic; or we can try to “exploit,”
asking collection questions.
To formalize our decision making, we assume that the
decision on whether to explore or exploit depends only on
the current quiz that the user is solving and the current
state of the user, which can be described by the number of
correct answers 𝑎, the number of incorrect answers 𝑏, and
the number of times 𝑐 that we asked a collection question.
Given the state vector ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩ of the user, we use a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) to select the next action to take,
based on the following considerations.
∙ User dropping out: At any point, the user may opt
to abandon the application. When the users drops
out, we do not obtain any additional utility; therefore
an optimal set of actions should try to steer the user
towards states with high probability of “survival.” (As
we will see in Section 6, the probability of abandon-
ment increases when the user gives incorrect answers
to the quiz questions, and when the user does not re-
ceive feedback about the correctness of the submitted
Algorithm 1: ComputeUtility(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑈pastquestion , 𝑙)
Data: Correct answers 𝑎, Incorrect answers 𝑏, Unknown answers 𝑐, Question utility 𝑈pastquestion , Horizon limit 𝑙
Result: Utility for all actions, Optimal next action
1 begin
2 if 𝑙 < 0 then
3 return 0 // Reached the limit of computing horizon
4 end
5 𝛾 = 𝑃𝑟(survive|⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩) // The (conditional) probability that the user will answer the served question.
6 𝑒𝑖𝑔 = 𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑛)] // Expected information gain
7 𝑠𝑖𝑔 =
√︀
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑛)] // Standard deviation of information gain
8 𝑈nowquestion = 𝑒𝑖𝑔 − 𝑠𝑖𝑔 // The estimate of information gain for a question at the ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩ state
/* Utility estimation for a collection question */
9 𝑈nowcoll = 𝑈
now
question // If we ask a collection question, we get 𝑒𝑖𝑔 − 𝑠𝑖𝑔 extra utility
10 𝑈 futurecoll = ComputeUtility(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐+ 1, 𝑈
now
question , 𝑙 − 1) // Utility from future steps
11 𝑈coll = 𝛾 · (𝑈nowcoll + 𝑈 futurecoll ) // Total utility of asking a collection question
/* Utility estimation for a calibration question */
12 𝑞 = (𝑎+ 1)/(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 𝑛) // Probability of user answering correctly a calibration question
/* Utility if the user answers correctly */
13 𝑈
now/corr
question = 𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑎+ 1, 𝑏, 𝑛)]−
√︀
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑎+ 1, 𝑏, 𝑛)] // Information gain, after a correct answer
14 𝑈
now/corr
calib = 𝑐 · (𝑈
now/corr
question − 𝑈pastquestion ) // Revise information gain for all 𝑐 previously-asked collection questions.
15 𝑈
fut/corr
calib = ComputeUtility(𝑎+ 1, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑈
now/corr
question , 𝑙 − 1) // Utility from future steps, after a correct answer
/* Utility if the user answers incorrectly */
16 𝑈
now/incorr
question = 𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏+ 1, 𝑛)]−
√︀
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏+ 1, 𝑛)] // Information gain, after an incorrect answer
17 𝑈
now/incorr
calib = 𝑐 · (𝑈
now/incorr
question − 𝑈pastquestion ) // Revise information gain for all 𝑐 previously-asked collection
questions.
18 𝑈
fut/incorr
calib = ComputeUtility(𝑎, 𝑏+ 1, 𝑐, 𝑈
now/incorr
question , 𝑙 − 1) // Utility from future steps, after an incorrect answer
19 𝑈calib = 𝛾 · (𝑞 · (𝑈 fut/corrcalib + 𝑈
now/corr
calib ) + (1− 𝑞) · (𝑈
fut/incorr
calib + 𝑈
now/incorr
calib )) // Total utility of calibration
20 if 𝑈calib > 𝑈coll then
21 Action = Ask calibration question
22 else
23 Action = Ask collection question
24 end
25 return {𝑈calib , 𝑈coll , 𝑈nowquestion}, Action
26 end
answer.) In our application, we estimate the prob-
ability 𝑃𝑟(survive|⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩) based on the empirically-
observed “lifetimes” of users, using a non-parametric
kernel-density estimator with Gaussian smoothing.7
(See Figure 6.)
∙ Ask a collection question: When we select to ask
a collection question, there are two components for the
utility that the Quizz system receives. Namely, there
is immediate utility of getting information about the
potential answer for the question, and there is utility
that we will accumulate from the future actions of
the user. The former utility is equal to the expected
information gain for the user given his current state
vector ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩ (see Equation 3). However, we want to be
more pessimistic about the utility estimates and assign
more value to learning about the user competency.
Following the “value of learning” approach [24], we
therefore set the reward to 𝑈nowquestion = 𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)] −√︀
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)], in order to encourage our application
to learn more about the user before asking her to
7We use the KernSmooth package in R.
contribute new knowledge. The utility for the future
steps 𝑈 futurecoll is the utility for the state vector ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐+1⟩,
as we asked one more collection question.
∙ Ask a calibration question: When we select to ask
a calibration question, we are trying to learn more
about the competence of the user on the specific topic
of the quiz. When presented with a question, the user
may give either a correct or incorrect answer, which will
lead to a revision of the 𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)] and 𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)]
metrics. Although we do not get directly a utility by
asking a collection question, the revised estimate of
𝑈nowquestion applies to all 𝑐 previously asked collection ques-
tions. Therefore, the 𝑈nowcalib = 𝑐 ·
(︀
𝑈nowquestion − 𝑈pastquestion
)︀
where 𝑈pastquestion is the previous estimate of the utility of
a collection question. Furthermore, the utility of future
steps, is the stochastic sum of two possible forward
paths: The utility 𝑈correctcalib when the user gives the cor-
rect answer (with probability 𝑞 = (𝑎+ 1)/(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 𝑛)),
and the utility 𝑈 incorrectcalib when the user gives an incor-
rect answer.
Algorithm 1 describes the implementation of this MDP.
One immediate concern with this formulation is that the
recursive algorithm definition points to states in the future,
and hence the total reward could potentially be infinite. This
concern is alleviated if we assume that the information gain
in each step in bounded, and that the probability of survival
𝛾 = max{𝑃𝑟(survive|⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩)} < 1. We know that the
maximum information gain derived from a single question
is log(𝑛) and there is always a non-zero probability that
the user will abandon the application. Therefore, the total
utility that can be extracted from a single user is bounded
by
∑︀
𝑖 𝛾
𝑖 · log(𝑛) ≤ log(𝑛)
1−𝛾 .
Another problem that arises with a recursive definition that
points to future states is that the computational estimation
becomes harder. Classic dynamic programming solutions
assume a setting of backwards induction, where the recursion
eventually leads to some initial state that has a known utility
(e.g., the recursive computation of 𝑈(⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩) depends on
𝑈(⟨𝑎′, 𝑏′, 𝑐′⟩) with 𝑎′ ≤ 𝑎, 𝑏′ ≤ 𝑏, 𝑐′ ≤ 𝑐). However, in our
setting we have a forward induction, making the computation
of recursion challenging. To allow the recursive computation
to complete, we introduce a limited execution horizon for
the recursion [29]: once the recursion has exceeded that
level of depth, we stop the computation and return. To find
out whether the algorithm converges, we run the algorithm
iteratively with increasing horizon, until observing that the
actions and utility calculations converge. Empirically, the
algorithm converges faster when the survival probabilities
𝑃𝑟(survive|⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐⟩) become smaller.
5. ENGAGEMENT INCENTIVES
In the previous section, we discussed how we can alter-
nate between “exploration” and “exploitation” in order to
assess the user’s competence and collect new information,
respectively. A key requirement for the algorithm to work
effectively is to have a reasonable level of participation from
the users: if a user submits just a couple of answers, we
cannot effectively assess the user’s competence or reliably
collect new information.
Therefore, a key component of Quizz is the ability to con-
tinuously run experiments with various incentive mechanisms,
that are trying to incentivize users to continue participating.
Based on theories of intrinsic motivation [25], we imple-
mented a variety of incentives, with the goal of prolonging
the participation of competent users, while gently discourag-
ing the non-knowledgeable users from submitting low-quality
answers. Specifically, we tried the following options:
∙ Feedback for submitted answer: We experimented
with various types of feedback that we give back to
the users. We tried giving no feedback, saying whether
the answer was correct or not, and showing the correct
answer. The basic hypothesis is that immediate perfor-
mance feedback [25] should motivate competent users
to continue participating, and potentially incentivize
low-performing users to try to improve their perfor-
mance.
∙ Displaying scores: We experimented with displaying
different types of scores to the user. We displayed
the percentage of correct answers, the total number of
correct answers, and a score based on the information
gain, and combinations thereof.
∙ Displaying crowd performance: We experimented
with showing the crowd performance on each question
(i.e., how many users answered the question correctly).
We hypothesized that knowing how other users perform
is going to increase the user effort.
∙ Leaderboards: We experimented with showing the
ranking of the user compared to other participants.
Our hypothesis was that users will modify their behav-
ior [2, 11] striving to reach one of the top leaderboard
positions.
6. EVALUATION
6.1 Metrics
In order to evaluate our system, we used the following
metrics to quantify the level of user engagement and the
quality of their contributions.
∙ Conversion rate: We define conversion rate as the
fraction of users who answered at least one quiz ques-
tion, after clicking one of our ads (cf. Section 2). We
use this metric to measure the effectiveness of our ad-
vertising.
∙ User lifetime: We examine the number of (correct
and incorrect) answers submitted by the users. We
use this metric mainly to understand the effect of the
various engagement incentives.
∙ Total information gain: We measure the expected
information gain of each user using Equation 3, and
multiply this value by the total number of answers sub-
mitted by the user. The result is the total information
that we received from the user.
∙ Monetary cost per correct fact: We measure the
total cost required to verify a fact at the 90%, 95%,
and 99% estimated accuracy. To compute the cost for
various levels of accuracy, we use the fact that if we
know the quality of a contributor, we can estimate
the required redundancy to reach the desired level of
confidence [35, 15]. For example, if we have two users
that are 90% accurate and we pay a cost of $0.10 per
contributed answer, we need one such worker to verify a
fact at 90% accuracy (i.e., cost $0.10 at 90% accuracy),
and approximately two such workers to verify a fact at
the 99% (i.e., cost $0.20 at 99% accuracy). To evaluate
the correctness of the answers submitted by the users
and the corresponding capacity of the system, we used
questions with answers that have been pre-validated
by multiple, trusted human judges. The costs are
calculated based on the total advertising expenditure
for attracting the users to the Quizz site, broken down
by quiz.
6.2 Capacity and cost analysis
Based on our measurements for September 2013, the con-
version rate for the Quizz application was an average of
34.60%, resulting in a total of 4,091 engaged users out of
11,825 users that visited the application (having clicked
an ad). The conversion rate increased steadily over time,
starting at around 20% in the beginning of the month, and
reaching a high of 51.25% on September 30th. (As we will
Quiz Users Answers Cost Capacity/User Cost/Answer
@99% @95% @90% @99% @95% @90%
Disease Causes 414 7,644 $51.13 3.75 4.83 6.49 $0.07 $0.05 $0.04
Disease Symptoms 569 11,088 $12.51 3.30 4.25 5.71 $0.02 $0.01 $0.01
Treatment Side Effects 605 5,044 $46.38 1.22 1.57 2.12 $0.13 $0.10 $0.07
Artist and Albums 310 1,548 $21.56 0.88 1.13 1.52 $0.16 $0.13 $0.09
Latest Album 522 2,588 $20.70 0.95 1.23 1.65 $0.09 $0.07 $0.05
Artist and Song 925 5,285 $236.26 0.96 1.23 1.66 $0.54 $0.42 $0.31
Film Directors 412 2,250 $16.49 1.19 1.54 2.07 $0.07 $0.05 $0.04
Movie Actors 337 2,189 $36.14 0.96 1.24 1.66 $0.22 $0.18 $0.13
Average 512 4,704 $55.15 1.65 2.13 2.86 $0.16 $0.12 $0.09
Table 1: Answers that can be collected per user and corresponding cost at 90%, 95%, and 99% accuracy
levels. The capacity per user metric is the number of collection questions that can be answered using the
Quizz system, at different levels of accuracy. Cost is the amortized cost per question. All campaigns run
with the conversion optimizer enabled, and a target cost-per-conversion of $0.10.
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Figure 5: Distribution of participation. The vertical
axis is the the number of users (in log scale), the
horizontal axis is the of the total information gain.
discuss below, this is due to the continuous optimization
from the conversion optimizer).
In our experiments we used eight different quizzes on
various topics, and we report in Table 1 the detailed results
in terms of user recruitment, cost, and the capacity of the
system in providing answers to new questions at different
accuracy levels. On average, we paid $0.16 to validate a
fact at the 99% accuracy level, and $0.09 to validate a fact
at the 95% accuracy level. An interesting outlier is the
“Artist and Song” quiz, which ended up having significantly
higher costs per collected answer compared to the other
quizzes. In this case, effectively we observed a failure of
the advertising system to identify a group of users that
would be knowledgeable of all the artists and songs that
appeared in the quiz: given the diversity of music genres
in that quiz, it was difficult to find music fans that have
detailed knowledge of all the song titles of various artists
across multiple genres. (However, it was possible to find
music fans that have knowledge of at least the album names
of different artists, an admittedly easier task.)
6.3 User contributions and self-selection
In terms of a per-user contribution, Figure 5 shows the
distribution of total information gain across the participating
users, and Figure 6 shows the lifetime of users as a function
of their quality. As expected, many users come, submit a
few answers, and then leave. These are the “head” users;
although they do contribute some useful signal, they do not
Figure 6: Lifetime of users according to their contri-
bution quality.
generate a great “return on investment.” Figure 7 further
illustrates that the users that submit large number of answers
also tend to submit more correct answers than incorrect. This
means that the users who are competent about the topic
submit more and more answers, while the ones who cannot
answer the quiz questions correctly, drop out. This is an
illustration of the benefit of unpaid users: there is little
incentive for unpaid users to continue participating when
there is no monetary reward and they are not good at the
task. (We present a more detailed comparison with paid
crowdsourcing in Section 6.7.)
6.4 The effect of targeting in advertising
Amajor hypothesis of our work is that the targeting system
of existing advertising networks can be leveraged in order to
identify competent users, who are willing to contribute new
knowledge by answering quiz questions. We observe that
users recruited through advertising are knowledgable and
willing to contribute. However, it is not immediate obvious
whether the positive result is due to targeting, or is simply
the effect of bringing more users to the application.
In order to disentangle the effects of advertising and tar-
geting, we ran two different advertising campaigns that both
directed users to the same quiz. Both campaigns had the
same budget, same ad creatives, same bidding settings, and
their only differences were (1) the keywords used for the
bidding and (2) the use of feedback to the advertising system.
Figure 7: Quality of submissions as a function of user
participation. (Intensity of dot color corresponds to
the number of users represented by the dot; fitted
line computed using LOESS.) Knowledgeable users
self-select and to continue submitting answers, lead-
ing to significant increase of answer quality for heavy
participants. Low-performers drop out voluntarily
without submitting many answers.
Figure 8: Comparison of conversions for targeted
vs. untargeted ad campaign (screenshot from Google
Analytics; the upper plot shows the information gain
for the two campaigns as a function of time; blue:
targeted, yellow: untargeted). The targeted cam-
paign generates 9.2x more conversions, as well as
higher-quality answers.
In the targeted campaign, we used keywords related to the
topic of the quiz; for the untargeted campaign we used the
keywords from all the quizzes available in the Quizz system.
Also, in the untargeted campaign, we did not send feedback
about conversions to avoid providing targeting information.
Figure 8 shows the results. While the number of visitors
was roughly the same for the two campaigns, the targeted
campaign had 3x higher conversion rate (34.62% vs. 13.43%).
Furthermore, among the participating (“converted”) users,
the number of questions answered per user was 3x higher for
the users who arrived from the targeted campaign. Thus, the
cumulative difference was over 9.2x more answers obtained
through the targeted campaign compared to the untargeted
one (2866 answers vs. 279). Finally, the answers contributed
by the users from the targeted campaign were of higher
quality than the answers from the untargeted campaign: the
total information gain for the targeted campaign was 11.4x
higher than the total information gain for the untargeted one
(7560 bits vs. 610 bits), indicating a higher user competence,
even on a normalized, per-question basis.
6.5 The effect of using conversion optimizer
After verifying that targeting and feedback indeed improve
the results, we wanted to examine the effect of using the
Variable: Total Coefficients Significance
showCorrect 0.142475 ***
showMessage -0.008423
showPercentageCorrect -0.003646
showTotalCorrect 0.085231 ***
showScore 0.093463 ***
showCrowdAnswers 0.025502 *
showPercentageRank -0.074008 ***
showTotalCorrectRank -0.006259
Variable: Correct
showCorrect 0.13936 ***
showMessage 0.002874
showPercentageCorrect 0.010314
showTotalCorrect 0.085838 ***
showScore 0.062361 ***
showCrowdAnswers 0.041233 *
showPercentageRank -0.101775 ***
showTotalCorrectRank -0.007062
Variable: Score
showCorrect 0.204104 ***
showMessage 0.024464 **
showPercentageCorrect 0.023831 ***
showTotalCorrect -0.022065 ***
showScore 0.040387 ***
showCrowdAnswers 0.098557 ***
showPercentageRank -0.048658 ***
showTotalCorrectRank -0.016987 ***
Table 2: The effect of various mechanisms in incen-
tivizing users to submit more answers Total, more
correct answers Correct, and to improve their to-
tal information gain Score. The coefficients were
computed by a Poisson regression model (***: 0.1%
significance, **: 1% significance, *: 5% significance).
Given that 𝑒𝑥 ≈ 1+𝑥 for small values of 𝑥, a coefficient
of 0.1 means that we observe a 10% improvement,
while a coefficient of -0.1 means that we observe a
10% decrease in performance.
conversion optimizer. While traditional ad campaigns usu-
ally optimize for clicks, the conversion optimizer of Google
AdWords offers the option to optimize for the total “value” of
the conversions (in our case, for the total information gain).
To examine the usefulness of the conversion optimizer in our
setting, we again run two otherwise-identical ad campaigns:
one being optimized for clicks, and the other being optimized
for conversions.
The conversion rate increased by 30% when using the
conversion optimizer (from 29% to 39%). In addition to that,
the number of submitted answers went up by 42% (1683 vs.
1183), and the total information gain went up by 63% (4690
bits vs. 2870 bits). Furthermore, as Section 6.2 discusses, the
optimization is ongoing and the conversion rate continues to
go up even at the time of this writing. This automatic and
continuous optimization of the process illustrates the benefits
of leveraging existing, publicly available advertising platforms
to improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing applications.
6.6 The effect of engagement incentives
To analyze the effect of the various incentive mechanisms,
we examined how the different experimental conditions as-
signed to the users affected their participation and their
overall contributions. To this end, we examined the effect
of the various incentives on three variables of interest: the
total number of submitted answers, the number of correct
answers, and the (total information gain) score of the user.
Since the dependent variables are always positive and behave
like “count data” we ran a Poisson regression, with eight
binary variables as dependent variables, where each of these
variables corresponded to the presence (or absence) of an
experimental condition. Specifically, we present results for
the following incentive mechanisms:
∙ showCorrect: Show the correct answer.
∙ showCrowdAnswers: Show the percentage of other
users who answered the question correctly.
∙ showMessage: Show whether the given answer was
correct.
∙ showPercentageCorrect: Show the percentage of
submitted answers (for that user) that were correct.
∙ showTotalCorrect: Show the total number of correct
answers submitted by that user.
∙ showScore: Show the total information gain for the
user (shown as a score).
∙ showPercentageRank: Show the position of the user
in the leaderboard, ranked by percentage of correct
answers.
∙ showTotalCorrectRank: Show the position of the
user in the leaderboard, ranked by the total number of
correct answers submitted.
Table 2 summarizes the results, and shows the coefficients
computed for each mechanism by the regression model. Show-
ing the correct answer (showCorrect) has the strongest im-
pact in increasing participation, as it has strong positive
effect across all three dependent variables, indicating that
users want to know what the correct answer is. Interestingly,
knowing whether they were correct or not (showMessage)
does not have a similarly strong effect. These results indicate
that users may be more interested in learning about the topic
rather than just knowing whether they answered correctly.
Experimenting with the performance-related incentives
(i.e., showPercentageCorrect, showTotalCorrect, showScore)
generated some interesting observations. Showing the per-
centage of correct answers did not have a statistically sig-
nificant effect in terms of answer counts, but had a slightly
positive effect in the total information gain. Showing the
total number of correct answers generated an interesting
effect: while both total and correct answers went up, the
total information gain was affected negatively. It appears
that non-competent users were also positively influenced to
participate more, leading to a decrease of the overall answer
quality. Not surprisingly, when we show the total informa-
tion gain as a score to the user, this effect disappears, and
we observe positive outcomes across all variables.
Finally, the competitive incentives (i.e., showCrowdAn-
swers, showPercentageRank, showTotalCorrectRank) demon-
strated an interesting behavior of the users: knowing the
performance of other users has a positive effect in the par-
ticipation, which indicates that users are interested in how
they fare against other users. However, displaying leader-
boards had a generally negative effect across all variables.
Figure 9: Comparison of unpaid users vs. com-
mon payment schemes (hourly and piecemeal pay-
ments). Paid workers are not experts in the pre-
sented topic, and their quality is barely above ran-
dom, despite the bonus incentives for good perfor-
mance; furthermore, the monetary reward incen-
tivizes low-perfoming paid workers to continue par-
ticipating.
Interestingly enough, if we examine the effect of leaderboards
in the early stages of the application, we see a very strong
positive effect in terms of participation. Our hypothesis
to explain these contradicting observations is the following.
Early on, the leaderboards are relatively sparsely populated
and it is relatively easy for users to go up and reach some
of the top positions. However, as more and more users par-
ticipate, the achievements of the top users are difficult to
match, effectively discouraging users from trying harder. To
test our hypothesis, we ran a small experiment, where the
leaderboard was computed based on the participation from
last week, as opposed to showing an all-time leaderboard.
The results indicated that the “last-week” leaderboard with
fewer and less impressive achievements has indeed had a
positive effect on participation, compared to the “all-time”
leaderboard. This indicates that users are motivated by the
potential for achievement, and by showing the users that
they can reach an achievement in a relatively easy manner
can help with participation.
6.7 Comparison with paid crowdsourcing
Finally, we wanted to compare the performance of our
approach against a pure paid-crowdsourcing setting. To
this end, we hired workers through Mechanical Turk, and
paid them 5 cents per question (i.e., piecemeal payment),
with an extra bonus that depended on their total score
(information gain) at the end. Similarly, we hired workers
via oDesk, paid them on an hourly basis (ranging from
$5/hr to $15/hr, depending on their asking price), and we
also indicated that they will receive an additional payment
based on their overall score. Figure 9 summarizes the results.
Our key observation is that the workers hired through paid
crowdsourcing platforms are usually not experts in the topic
of the quiz, and are therefore not sufficiently knowledgeable
to provide high quality answers. However, unlike the unpaid
workers, the paid workers have an obvious monetary incentive
to continue working, and so we did not observe the self-
selection dropout effect for the paid workers. The paid
workers continue submitting low-quality answers, and this
finding is similar with both piecemeal and hourly payments.
While there are some compeqtent workers among the paid
participants, the total information gain from the competent
paid workers is still significantly lower than the information
gain from unpaid users, resulting in significantly lower ca-
pacities. The best paid worker had a 68% quality for the
quiz, and submitted 40 answers, resulting in an equivalent
capacity of 13 answers at 99% accuracy, or 23 answers at 90%
accuracy. To match the performance of the unpaid users, the
worker should be paid 5 cents per question, or $3/hr, taking
into account that the average time per question for the paid
users is one minute. (For comparison, unpaid users are much
faster and typically give an answer within 10 seconds, sig-
naling that they are already knowledgeable about the topic
of hte quiz and they do not perform research to answer the
questions.) Given that all other workers demonstrated worse
metrics, it is clear that unpaid, volunteer users dominate. A
potential solution is to experiment with negative incentives
(e.g., “you will not get paid unless you achieve this quality
score”), keeping away the low perfomers, and keeping just
the top workers. However, it is not clear how we can reach
these high-quality workers in a labor market, other than by
posting the task and then hoping that the competent workers
will participate. Potentially, labor marketplaces can employ
targeting schemes, similar to the ones we implemented us-
ing online advertising, but today we are not aware of any
marketplace offering such functionality.
7. RELATEDWORK
Quizz crowdsources the acquisition of knowledge by asking
users to participate in thematically-focuses quizzes, which
contain also “collection” questions with no known answer.
ReCAPTCHA [34] is close conceptually, as it asks users to
type two digitized words, out of which one is known and the
other is unknown, which is similar to our calibration and
collection questions, respectively. In terms of use of advertis-
ing for recruiting users, Hoffman et al. [17] use advertising
to attract participants for a Wikipedia-editing experiment;
however there was no discussion or experiments with target-
ing, or with optimizing the ad campaigns for maximizing the
user contributions.
Recent work [2, 11] built models on how badges and leader-
boards should be designed to engage users and steer their
behavior towards actions that are beneficial for the system.
Our work empirically tests some of these models, and our
experimental results dovetail the suggestions of these mod-
els. Other models of user engagement have examined what
metrics and measurments capture the user level of engage-
ment [23, 5, 6, 10, 26]. Our analysis of engagement focuses
mainly on web analytics measurements, without trying to
interact further with the participating users, although this
is a promising direction for future work.
In our work, we explicitly assess the competence of users
with calibration questions. Alternatively, we can use unsu-
pervised techniques for estimating the competence of users,
through redundancy. Dawid and Skene [8] presented an EM
algorithm to estimate the quality of the participants in the
absence of known ground truth, and a large number of recent
papers examined the same topic [30, 39, 37] improving signif-
icantly the state of the art. Being closer to our work, Kamar
et al. [21] also use a Markov Decision Process, in order to
decide whether the answers provided by a user are promising
enough to warrant a hiring decision. In the future, we plan
to use these algorithms for quality inference together with
our exploration/exploitation approach, to decide optimally
how to combine assessment with knowledge acquisition. A
key challenge is being able to provide immediate feedback to
the users, when the questions have no certain answer.
Optimal acceptance sampling plans in quality control [9,
38, 7, 32] is another related line of work. The purpose of
acceptance sampling is to determine how much to sample a
production line, in order to decide whether to accept or reject
a production lot. The key difference with our setting is the
limited lifetime of the users (as opposed to the significantly
higher production capacity in industrial production), and
our planning needs to be much more dynamic than in the
most use cases of acceptance sampling.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a model for targeting and engaging unpaid
users in a crowdsourcing application. We demonstrated how
to use existing Internet advertising platforms to identify
niche audiences of competent users for the task at hand,
and we showed that using publicly available ad-optimization
tools can result in significant improvements in the effective-
ness of the process. Currently, our application has a 50%
conversion rate for every ad click, and the cost per answer
drops systematically over time, as the advertising system
learns to identify competent users that are likely to be high
contributors. The engagement of unpaid users alleviates con-
cerns about the incentives of paid users, who are not always
well-aligned with the goals of the crowdsourcing application.
Furthermore, our algorithms and controlled real-life experi-
ments with over ten thousand users illustrate how to setup
incentive mechanisms in practice to engage users and ex-
tend their “lifetime” in the system. Finally, our experiments
indicate that even though there are costs associated with
advertising, the quality-adjusted costs are on par with those
of paid crowdsourcing. (Moreover, for non-profits, engag-
ing for example in citizen science efforts, there are ways to
get a substantial advertising budget using programs such as
“Google Ad Grants for nonprofits,”8 which offers $10,000 per
month in in-kind advertising budget.) We believe that our
ad-based approach can form the foundation towards more
predictable deployment and engagement of unpaid users in
crowdsourcing efforts, combining the advantage of engaging
unpaid users with the predictability of paid crowdsourcing.
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APPENDIX
A. VARIANCE OF INFORMATION GAIN
When the quality 𝑞 of a user is uncertain, then the infor-
mation gain for each question is also uncertain. Under the
assumption the probability 𝑞, that a user answers a question
correctly, is the same across all questions, and that the prior
is a uniform distribution, then the variance of the information
gain distribution is given by:
8http://www.google.com/grants/
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[𝐼𝐺(𝑞, 𝑛)] = log(𝑛)2 +
2𝑎𝑏 · 𝐼𝑎𝑏
(𝑎+ 𝑏)(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)
+
𝑎(𝑎+ 1) · 𝐽𝑎
(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)(𝑎+ 𝑏)
+
𝑏(𝑏+ 1) · 𝐽𝑏
(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)(𝑎+ 𝑏)
+
𝑏(𝑏+ 1) log(𝑛− 1)2
(𝑎+ 𝑏)(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)
+
2𝑏 · log(𝑛− 1) ·𝐾𝑎𝑏
(𝑎+ 𝑏) · (𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)
−2 log(𝑛) · log(𝑛− 1) · 𝑏
𝑎+ 𝑏
− 2 log(𝑛) · 𝐸[𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑛)]
𝐽𝑎 = (Ψ(𝑎+ 2)−Ψ(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2))2
+Ψ1(𝑎+ 2)−Ψ1(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2)
𝐽𝑏 = (Ψ(𝑏+ 2)−Ψ(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2))2
+Ψ1(𝑏+ 2)−Ψ1(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2)
𝐼𝑎𝑏 = (Ψ(𝑎+ 1)−Ψ(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2)) · (Ψ(𝑏+ 1)
−Ψ(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2))−Ψ1(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 2)
𝐾𝑎𝑏 = (𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)Ψ(𝑎+ 𝑏+ 1)
−(𝑏+ 1)Ψ(𝑏+ 1)− 𝑎Ψ(𝑎+ 1)
where Ψ(𝑥) is the digamma function, Ψ1(𝑥) is the trigamma
function, 𝑛 is the number of options presented to the user,
𝑎 − 1 is the number of correct, and 𝑏 − 1 is the number of
incorrect answers submitted by the user [3].
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